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 Equity Incentives and Earnings Management 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the link between managers’ equity incentivesarising from stock-
based compensation and stock ownershipand earnings management. We hypothesize that 
managers with high equity incentives are more likely to sell shares in the future and this 
motivates these managers to engage in earnings management to increase the value of the shares 
to be sold. Using stock-based compensation and stock ownership data over the 1993-2000 time 
period, we document that managers with high equity incentives sell more shares in subsequent 
periods. As expected, we find that managers with high equity incentives are more likely to report 
earnings that meet or just beat analysts’ forecasts. We also find that managers with consistently 
high equity incentives are less likely to report large positive earnings surprises. This finding is 
consistent with the wealth of these managers being more sensitive to future stock performance, 
which leads to increased reserving of current earnings to avoid future earnings disappointments. 
Collectively, our results indicate that equity incentives lead to incentives for earnings 
management. 
 
Key Words: Equity incentives, stock-based compensation, stock ownership, insider trading, 
earnings management, meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts, abnormal accruals. 
Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from the sources identified in the text. 
JEL Classification: G29, J33, M41, M43. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Regulators and investors have raised concerns that certain management incentives could 
lead to earnings management, reducing the informativeness of financial reporting and 
contributing to recent corporate scandals (Levitt 1998; Knowledge at Wharton 2003). Of 
particular recent concern is that stock-based compensation might induce managers to increase the 
short-term stock price through earnings management. For example, Michael Jensen argues that 
stock-based compensation and other equity incentive elements can encourage managers to 
increase short-term stock prices in order to benefit from subsequently selling shares of their own 
firms’ stock (The Economist 2002).1 Indeed, these concerns have contributed to new calls for the 
expensing of stock options, other regulatory constraints on compensation practices, and 
improved corporate governance (FASB 2004; Morgenson 2003; Conference Board 2002). 
However, there is little empirical evidence on the relation between equity incentives and earnings 
management. The purpose of this paper is to examine this relation, thereby providing evidence 
that can be used to corroborate or refute allegations of equity incentive related earnings 
management.  
Modern corporations employ various mechanisms to remedy the adverse consequences 
arising from the separation of ownership and control (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Encouraging 
managerial ownership is an example of such mechanisms. Theoretically, as managers own more 
shares, they are more likely to act in the interests of shareholders. One way to increase the level 
of managerial ownership is to award managers options or shares of stock (Core and Guay 1999). 
Prior research examines the association of managerial ownership and stock-based compensation 
with future firm performance, and finds evidence consistent with the incentive-alignment effect 
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of these equity incentive elements (Lambert and Larcker 1987; Morck et al. 1988; Hanlon et al. 
2003, among others). However, at the same time, these elements can lead managers to focus on 
short-term stock prices, thereby leading to incentives for earnings management. 
The incentives for earnings management arise from managers’ diversifying the increased 
risk associated with ownership or stock-based compensation. For example, Ofek and Yermack 
(2000) examine the dynamics of ownership and stock-based compensation, and find that when 
managers are awarded stock-based compensation, they tend to sell shares they already own for 
risk diversification reasons. Managers are likely to continue selling shares in the future if the risk 
exposure due to equity incentives is, or is expected to be, above the level that managers are 
willing to bear. The risk exposure can increase in the future because when stock prices increase, 
managerial wealth becomes more concentrated in the stock and managers’ option holdings 
become riskier (i.e., more sensitive to stock prices).  
Because of this selling, a manager’s wealth is sensitive to the short-term stock price, which 
can motivate managers with high equity incentives to increase the short-term stock price. Given 
that the capital market uses current earnings to predict future earnings when pricing firm equity, 
these managers are expected to use their accounting discretion to manage earnings in order to 
keep the short-term stock price high (Stein 1989).  
In this paper, we explicitly examine the links from equity incentives to earnings 
management. In particular, we examine the following equity incentive elements: option grants, 
unexercisable options, exercisable options, restricted stock grants, and stock ownership. Because 
the positive relation between equity incentives and managers’ future sales of their own firms’ 
stock underpins the earnings management argument, we first document the existence of this 
relation. We measure a manager’s future net sales as the difference between open market sales 
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and the sum of open market purchases and the shares received from exercising options. The 
results indicate that, as expected, managers with high equity incentives have significantly higher 
levels of net sales in the year after earnings announcements.2  
Next, we investigate the association between equity incentives and earnings management 
by examining the extent to which managers report earnings that meet or just beat analysts’ 
forecasts. As expected, we find a significantly higher incidence of meeting or just beating 
analysts’ forecasts for firms with higher managerial equity incentives. Based on analyses that 
control for firm performance and other potential confounds, we conclude that our results are 
more consistent with earnings management induced by equity incentives as opposed to better 
firm performance attendant to incentive alignment benefits or to equity incentive elements 
correlating with other firm characteristics.  
We then examine whether managers who predictably engage in earnings management sell 
more shares after actual earnings management. We find that managers with high equity 
incentives sell more after meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts than after missing analysts’ 
forecasts. In contrast, we do not find such evidence for managers with low equity incentives. 
These results are consistent with high equity incentive managers increasing sales after earnings 
management.  
We also conduct additional analyses to enrich our results on earnings management. First, 
equity incentives can be recurring; managers with high equity incentives in the current period are 
more likely to have high equity incentives in the future. Thus, managers with high equity 
incentives can benefit from smoothing earnings. By reserving in good years, these managers can 
more easily meet or beat analysts’ forecasts in future periods. Consistent with this argument, we 
find that high equity incentive managers are less likely to report large positive earnings surprises 
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compared to those with low equity incentives. The evidence is particularly strong for firms with 
more persistent equity incentives. Second, we find that high equity incentive managers on 
average report more income-increasing abnormal accruals, especially for managers with less 
persistent equity incentivesthose who are less concerned with the reversal of accruals. We also 
find that managers sell more shares after taking income-increasing abnormal accruals. Lastly, our 
findings are robust to alternative measurements of key variables, the inclusion of other control 
variables, and alternative regression specifications.  
Overall, consistent with regulators’ and investors’ concerns about equity incentives, we 
find that high equity incentive managers are more likely to engage in earnings management, 
relative to managers with low equity incentives. This evidence contributes to the compensation 
literature by extending research on compensation-related opportunistic behavior. By 
documenting one potential consequence of stock-based compensation and ownership, this paper 
should be of interest to boards of directors contemplating compensation contracts for managers. 
While stock-based compensation and ownership can yield positive incentive alignment effects, 
optimal compensation contracts should reflect the earnings management consequences arising 
from these equity incentives.  
This paper also contributes to the earnings management literature. Although earnings 
management has received considerable attention in the accounting literature, little is known 
about the earnings management incentives arising from stock-based compensation or ownership. 
This paper therefore extends research on compensation-related earnings management beyond 
that related to bonus contracts as documented in Healy (1985) and Warfield et al. (1995).  
Our paper is related to other concurrent studies of the capital market pressure on managers 
due to equity incentives. Ke (2001) finds that managers’ equity incentives are positively 
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correlated with the duration of a string of quarterly earnings increases and Skinner and Myers 
(2000) find that firms tend to manage earnings to maintain a string of earnings increases. Beneish 
and Vargus (2002) find that income-increasing accruals, when accompanied with insider sales, 
are of lower quality, consistent with the notion that managers might manage earnings upward 
and then sell their own shares. We extend these studies by explicitly linking equity incentives to 
financial reporting attributes that reflect earnings management (meeting or just beating analysts’ 
forecasts, avoiding large positive earnings surprises, and recognizing abnormal accruals) and by 
providing direct evidence of managers trading in response to such earnings management.3  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we develop our 
hypothesis concerning equity incentives and earning management. In Section III, we describe the 
sample and data with primary results presented in Section IV. Section V discusses further 
analyses that provide additional insights and ensure the robustness of our results; Section VI 
concludes with a summary.  
 
II. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
The theoretical linkages for our study are illustrated in Figure 1. As indicated, the link 
between equity incentives and managers’ future trading is important because such trading 
motivates managers to care about short-term stock prices, resulting in earnings management 
incentives. In this section, we first discuss the relation between equity incentives and managers’ 
future trading of their own firms’ stock, and then present our hypothesis on earnings 
management. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
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Equity Incentives and Their Relation to Future Manager Trading 
Managerial ownership is an important mechanism to align managers’ incentives with those 
of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Morck et al. 1988). One way to increase ownership 
is through stock-based compensation. When a manager is granted options, the options usually are 
not exercisable until three or four years later. When options become exercisable (i.e., vested), 
managers can choose to hold exercisable options or to exercise the options and hold shares 
instead. (To finance option exercises, managers generally sell the shares received from 
exercising options.) Managers are also awarded restricted stock, which like option grants, does 
not vest (i.e., cannot be traded) until after three or four years. Another way to obtain shares is 
through open market purchases, which is common in early career stages (Core and Larcker 
2002).  
These various elements and their interrelationships are summarized in Figure 2. As 
indicated, at any point in time, such as at the fiscal-year-end, managers might have various forms 
of equity-based holdings: unexercisable options, exercisable options, and stock ownership. Due 
to these equity-based holdings, managers’ wealth is sensitive to their firms’ stock prices and 
managers therefore bear the idiosyncratic risk of the firm.  
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
The equilibrium risk level results from a balance of two opposing forces. From an 
incentive-alignment perspective, equity incentives help motivate managers to work in 
shareholders’ interests, thereby reducing agency costs. However, from the perspective of risk 
diversification, risk averse managers want to reduce their exposure to the idiosyncratic risk of the 
firm. Consequently, managers want to sell shares if the risk exposure level is higher than the 
equilibrium level.4 Even if the current risk exposure is at the equilibrium level, it can increase 
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beyond this level in the future due to changes in economic circumstances.  
For example, if stock prices increase, managers’ wealth becomes more concentrated in a 
single risky asset (i.e., their firms’ stock). Thus, the exposure of managers’ wealth to the 
idiosyncratic risk increases. Furthermore, based on option valuation theory (such as Black and 
Scholes 1973), the sensitivity of the value of unexercisable options to stock price (i.e., the hedge 
ratio or the delta of the option) increases with stock price.5 Under general capital asset pricing 
assumptions, the expected return of a firm’s stock is positive; that is, stock prices are expected to 
increase in normal economic circumstances. As a result, managers’ risk exposure due to equity 
incentives predictably increases in the future. If it increases beyond the equilibrium level, 
managers might sell shares they already own to diversify the risk.  
In summary, managers with higher equity incentives are more likely to sell shares (Link 2 
in Figure 1) and their wealth is therefore sensitive to short-term stock prices. This sensitivity can 
lead to incentives to increase short-term prices and the value of the shares managers are going to 
sell. To this end, they can make value-increasing production, financing, and investment 
decisions, and/or engage in earnings management. The latter is the focus of this study.  
 
Equity Incentives and Earnings Management  
Managers who sell shares in the future have earnings management incentives if two 
conditions hold: (1) the capital markets rely on reported earnings in forming beliefs about future 
earnings so that earnings management can affect stock prices, and (2) managers can take 
advantage of the increased stock prices. With respect to the first condition, Stein (1989, 657) 
argues, “… the stock market uses earnings to make a rational forecast of firm valuehigher 
earnings today will be correlated with higher earnings in the future.” Extant accounting research 
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shows that stock prices generally react to earnings announcements in the direction of earnings 
surprises, with analysts’ forecasts as the proxy for earnings expectations (O’Brien 1988; Brown 
and Kim 1991, among others). Thus, managers can use their accounting discretion to affect 
reported earnings and stock prices if the capital markets have difficulty in detecting earnings 
management.6  
If stock prices increase with earnings management, managers gain more from selling shares 
in the future than without earnings management. Thus, condition (2) is satisfied, unless litigation 
or reputation concerns deter managers from taking advantage of the increased stock price. The 
evidence in prior research is consistent with managers being able to benefit from insider trading. 
For example, Seyhun (1998) and Lakonishok and Lee (2001), among others, find that insiders 
are generally better informed and earn abnormal returns. With respect to accounting information 
disclosed through management forecasts or earnings announcements, Penman (1982), Sivakumar 
and Waymire (1994), and Noe (1999) find that managers sell more after good news than after 
bad news. Summers and Sweeney (1998) and Beneish (1999) find that managers of firms 
accused of accounting fraud sell their own shares before these firms are formally subject to SEC 
enforcement actions. Similarly, Beneish and Vargus (2002) find evidence consistent with 
managers selling more after market participants overprice income-increasing accruals.  
Thus, extant research supports the link from insider trading to earnings management (Link 
3 in Figure 1). This link, combined with the above-discussed link from equity incentives to 
future trading, suggests that high equity incentive managers are more likely to engage in earnings 
management, relative to low equity incentive managers (Link 1 in Figure 1). This prediction is 
consistent with the conclusion in Stein (1989): managers who care about short-term stock prices 
are expected to manage earnings to increase short-term stock prices and such behavior increases 
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with the sensitivity of managers’ utility to current stock prices.7  
Lastly, earnings management incentives exist not only when investors are naïvefixating 
on reported earnings, but also when investors are sophisticatedadjusting for expected earnings 
management when pricing equity. Stein (1989) shows that when investors are sophisticated, in 
equilibrium, investors rationally expect managers to engage in earnings management, which they 
do. In other words, if the market has rational expectations of earnings management behavior but 
cannot completely undo earnings management of individual firms, it is optimal for market 
participants to price the reported earnings by adjusting for the impact of earnings management. 
Given investors’ pricing behavior, managers find it optimal to manage earnings.  
In sum, as depicted in Figure 1, managers with high equity incentives are likely to sell 
shares. Such trading behavior motivates managers to care about short-term stock prices and to 
manage earnings. Formally, we hypothesize that: 
H1: The incidence of earnings management is positively associated with equity incentives. 
In this paper, we focus on one particular proxy for earnings managementmeeting or just 
beating analysts’ forecasts. Recent studies of earnings management suggest that the 
disproportionate likelihood of meeting or just beating analysts’ forecasts is an important 
manifestation of earnings management (Degeorge et al. 1999; Burgstahler and Eames 2003, 
among others). We focus on this proxy because it has more direct market consequences relative 
to other proxies, such as abnormal accruals. Prior research has documented the reward for 
meeting analysts’ forecasts (Bartov et al. 2002; Kasznik and McNichols 2002) and the negative 
market consequences of missing analysts’ forecasts (Skinner and Sloan 2002). To further 
corroborate and enrich our earnings management results, in Section V we also analyze the 
likelihood of large positive earnings surprises to investigate the existence of earnings smoothing 
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and the recognition of abnormal accruals.  
 
III. SAMPLE AND DATA 
The initial sample includes all firm-years with data on CEOs’ stock-based compensation 
and ownership available from the Standard & Poor’s ExecuComp database for the period 1993-
2000.8 We exclude financial institutions (SICs between 6000 and 6999) and utilities (SICs 
between 4400 and 5000) because managers in these regulated industries might have different 
motivations to manage earnings (Burgstahler and Eames 2003, among others). The final sample 
used for specific analyses varies due to additional data requirements and is discussed in the 
empirical analysis sections. 
The timing of variable measurement is chosen to be consistent with our theoretical 
development. As summarized in Figure 3, all equity incentive variables are measured during or 
at the end of fiscal year t. Since we hypothesize that these variables are correlated with future 
manager trading and earnings management, earnings management is measured based on the 
information disclosed at the earnings announcement for fiscal year t, generally from one to four 
months after the fiscal-year-end. All trading variables are measured after earnings 
announcements (subsequent to the measurement of equity incentive and earnings management 
variables). 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
Equity incentives  
We consider five equity incentive elements: option grants in the current period, 
unexercisable options (excluding option grants in the current period), exercisable options, 
restricted stock grants, and stock ownership. We deflate these measures (in shares) by total 
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outstanding shares of the firm. Because the potential benefit of increasing short-term stock 
prices, if any, is shared by all shareholders (whether non-CEO shareholders realize it or not), the 
benefit enjoyed by CEOs is thus proportional to the ratio of equity incentive measures in shares 
to total outstanding shares.9  
Panel A of Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics on CEO equity incentive measures. 
Because we assume that CEOs can sell already held shares to diversify risk due to option or 
stock grants, we restrict our analyses to firm-years with ownership higher than option and stock 
grants.10 As reported in the table, option grants are on average 0.163 percent of outstanding 
shares. Option grants are part of the unexercisable options at the end of the year; the remaining 
unexercisable options average 0.254 percent. Exercisable options are on average 0.637 percent.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Restricted stock grants appear to play a small role in stock-based compensation. While 63.2 
percent of the sample report option grants, only 18.3 percent have restricted stock grants. The 
mean restricted stock grant is only 0.008 percent. Due to this small magnitude, stock grants can 
hardly have an economically significant impact on future trading or earnings management; thus 
for the sake of brevity, in the analyses we do not separate them from ownership, which averages 
4.184 percent. These descriptive statistics are similar to those reported in Ofek and Yermack 
(2000). 
Panel B of Table 1 reports correlations between equity incentive measures. The three 
option measures are positively correlated with each other and are also positively correlated with 
ownership.  
CEOs’ trading 
CEOs’ trading data are collected from the SEC ownership reporting system data file 
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(Forms 3, 4, 5). CEOs and other insiders are required to report their transactions by the tenth day 
of the calendar month after the trading month. As in prior research of insider trading (e.g., 
Lakonishok and Lee 2001), we examine three primary types of transactions: open market 
purchases, purchase of shares through the exercise of options, and open market sales (which 
include sales of shares from exercised options). Because the database assigns different names to 
CEOs, we regard individuals with titles like “Chairman of board” (42.4 percent), “CEO” (12.6 
percent), and “President” (45.0 percent) as CEOs, as done in Ke et al. (2003).  
We examine CEOs’ trading in the year after the earnings announcement for fiscal year t. 
CEOs’ trading is measured as net sales:11 
Net sales = Open market sales - (Open market purchases + Options exercised).  
Since the frequency of CEO trading is generally low, using past trading data as the deflator, as in 
Lakonishok and Lee (2001), is not feasible. Instead, we scale net sales in dollars by the firm’s 
market value at the end of fiscal year t (before net sales are measured). Using unscaled measures, 
either logarithm transformations or decile rankings, does not affect our inferences. 
Panel C of Table 1 reports descriptive statistics on CEOs’ net sales. To allow for variation 
in CEO trading within the year, we separately investigate net sales in the first and second six-
month periods. Net sales, on average, are approximately $2 million in a six-month period, 
representing about 0.2 percent of the firm’s market value. These descriptive statistics are 
consistent with those reported in Lakonishok and Lee (2001) and suggest that CEOs are net 
sellers on average.  
Earnings surprises 
Earnings surprises are calculated as the difference between actual earnings and analysts’ 
forecasts, both of which are measured on a per-share basis and are collected from First Call. To 
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better capture the market’s expectation, we use the most recent consensus forecasts within the 
three-month period before the earnings announcement. As reported in Panel D of Table 1 and 
consistent with prior research, there are more firm-years meeting or just beating analysts’ 
forecasts than just missing analysts’ forecasts.12 Of 4,301 firm-years with equity incentives and 
earnings surprises in the period 1993-2000, 25 percent have zero earnings surprises, i.e., meeting 
analysts’ forecasts, 17 percent beat analysts’ forecasts by one cent, but less than nine percent 
miss analysts’ forecasts by one cent.  
 
IV. PRIMARY EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
As discussed in Section II, the link between equity incentives and future CEOs’ trading is 
critical to our hypothesis that the incidence of earnings management is positively related with 
equity incentives. Since prior studies do not provide direct evidence on this link, in this section, 
we first report results on the relation between equity incentives and future trading.13 We then 
report results on the impact of equity incentives on the probability of meeting or just beating 
analysts’ forecasts. Lastly, we investigate whether managers sell more after earnings 
management.  
 
Equity Incentives and Future Trading  
We examine the relation between equity incentives (Eq_Incent) and future trading 
(NetSale) using the following regression: 
jt,it,i4t,i3t,i2t,i1t,i0jt,i OCFRetGrowthSizeIncentEqNetSale +−+ +∆+++++= ξγγγγγ β  ,  (1) 
where j = 1 or 2, denotes the jth six-month period after the earnings announcement. See Appendix 
A for variable measurement. Our focus is whether the coefficients on Eq_Incent are positive. In 
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the regression, we also include several control variables based on prior research of insider 
trading.14 Lakonishok and Lee (2001) find that insiders in large firms sell more shares, although 
in a smaller proportion to market value. Rozeff and Zaman (1998) find that insiders in growth 
firms sell more shares. Prior returns are included to control for contrarian trading behavior by 
insiders; insiders tend to sell more shares after high stock returns (Lakonishok and Lee 2001). 
Change in operating cash flow is included to control for any potential impact of firm 
performance on insider trading. We use a cash flow measure because it is less subject to earnings 
management compared to a performance measure based on earnings. The correlations reported in 
Appendix B indicate that these control variables are significantly correlated with each other and 
thus it is important to control for them at the same time. 
The regression results are reported in Table 2. Consistent with our prediction, option 
grants, other unexercisable options, and ownership have significantly positive coefficients, 
suggesting that CEOs with high equity incentives are more likely to sell in the next year. Since 
option grants and other unexercisable options are similarly correlated with future trading, we 
combine these two variables together in subsequent analyses for the sake of brevity. This 
modification does not affect our inferences.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
In contrast, exercisable options have an insignificant impact on CEOs’ trading. This result 
might seem unexpected, given the apparent similarity between unexercisable and exercisable 
options. However, unexercisable options differ from exercisable options in the hedge ratio, 
which captures CEOs’ risk exposure due to option holdings. To illustrate, when options are first 
granted, the hedge ratio is between zero and one. If stock prices increase after option grants, the 
hedge ratio of unexercisable options increases. To diversify the increased risk, the manager can 
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sell shares already owned. By the time options are exercisable and in the money, the hedge ratio 
is approximately one and no longer increases with stock prices. Thus, there is no need for further 
risk diversification.15 As a result, while unexercisable options are positively related to future 
insider sales, exercisable options are not. 
One might argue that although exercisable options likely have a constant hedge ratio, they 
expose CEOs to the firm’s idiosyncratic risk, just as ownership does. Unlike exercisable options, 
ownership is a more predominant equity incentive element (a much larger proportion of CEOs’ 
wealth, as indicated in Panel A of Table 1) and is thus a better proxy for CEOs’ over-exposure to 
idiosyncratic risk. Nevertheless, we admit that there are other possible explanations for the 
insignificant results on exercisable options, a topic we leave for future research. Importantly for 
our subsequent analyses, the measures that predict future CEO trading should be correlated with 
earnings management, but those that do not predict future trading should not be correlated with 
earnings management. Our earnings management results are consistent with these predictions. 
The control variable results are generally consistent with prior research. Size exhibits a 
negative association with net sales, suggesting that sales by CEOs of large firms are smaller in 
proportion to market value than those of small firms. Book-to-market also has a negative 
coefficient, suggesting that CEOs of growth firms sell more shares. The positive coefficient on 
stock returns is consistent with CEOs selling more shares after price increases. Change in cash 
flow, however, has an insignificant coefficient, although it becomes significantly positive when 
growth and stock returns are not included. 
In sum, we find that CEOs with high unexercisable options or high stock ownership are 
more likely to sell in the future. This result suggests that equity incentives can cause managers’ 
utility to be sensitive to short-term stock prices: if the short-term stock price is higher (lower), 
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the value of the shares to be sold, part of the management wealth, is higher (lower). The next 
section investigates whether this sensitivity induces a positive relation between equity incentives 
and earnings management, as hypothesized in H1.  
 
Equity Incentives and Earnings Management  
Tests of H1 are based on logit regressions of the probability of earnings surprises being in a 
certain range on equity incentive measures (Eq_Incent) and various control variables: 
)RevDownAFCVEstimateNum
mplicitClaiImLitigationSharesNOA
GrowthSalesGrowthSize
IncentEq(logit)Surprise(Prob
t,it,ik,10t,ik,9t,ik,8
t,ik,7t,ik,6t,ik,51t,ik,4
t,ik,31t,ik,2t,ik,1
t,ikk,0kt,i
ζγγγ
γγγγ
γγγ
γ
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+++
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−−−
−
−−
−β
 (2) 
Surpriseit is earnings surprise per share, as defined above; Φ could be one of the following two 
sets of earnings surprises: (1) negative earnings surprises; (2) zero or one cent; equity incentive 
measures include unexercisable options, exercisable options, and ownership. See Appendix A for 
variable measurement. H1 predicts positive coefficients on equity incentive measures when 
investigating the probability of meeting or just beating analysts’ forecasts (i.e., earnings surprises 
being zero or one cent). Relatedly, H1 implies a negative relation between equity incentives and 
the probability of missing analysts’ forecasts (i.e., negative earnings surprises).  
Following prior research, we include various control variables that might be correlated with 
earnings surprises and/or equity incentives. Equity incentives are generally higher for small firms 
or growth firms, and high growth firms might be more likely to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts 
to avoid the torpedo effect associated with missing analysts’ forecasts, as documented in Skinner 
and Sloan (2002). Thus, we control for firm size and growth (proxied by the book-to-market 
ratio and sales growth). Beginning-of-period net operating assets are included because Barton 
 17
and Simko (2002) find that firms with high net operating assets in the previous year are less 
likely to meet or just beat analysts’ forecasts, arguably due to a lack of flexibility in managing 
earnings upward. The number of outstanding shares is included because firms with more 
outstanding shares have smaller earnings per share and are thus more likely to meet or just beat 
analysts’ forecasts of earnings per share (Barton and Simko 2002).  
Prior research suggests other incentives to avoid negative earnings surprises. Ali and 
Kallapur (2001) and Francis et al. (1994) find that price declines due to negative earnings 
surprises can lead to litigation liability. Similarly, Bowen et al. (1995) argue that negative 
earnings surprises can have negative publicity effects, which can adversely affect the implicit 
claims between a firm and its stakeholders. Thus, the incentive to avoid negative earnings 
surprises increases with litigation risk and implicit claims. We include an industry-based 
litigation dummy variable and an implicit claim variable (proxied by labor intensity) as controls.  
We also include three variables to control for analyst forecast attributes: number of 
analysts, dispersion of individual forecasts, and a downward revision dummy. The incentives to 
meet analysts’ forecasts can be stronger if more analysts are following the firm or if there is 
greater consensus among analysts (Payne and Robb 2000). As shown in Matsumoto (2002), it is 
easier to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts that have been guided downward, so we include a 
dummy variable to indicate whether analysts’ forecasts are revised downward in the three 
months before earnings announcements. 
As reported in Appendix B, the univariate correlations between the probability of meeting 
or just beating analysts’ forecasts and independent variables, especially the equity incentive 
measures, are generally consistent with our predictions. While many correlations between 
independent variables are significant, none is substantial enough to lead to multicollinearity.  
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Table 3 reports the logit regression results. As expected, both unexercisable options and 
ownership exhibit significant positive effects on the probability of meeting or just beating 
analysts’ forecasts. For example, a one standard deviation increase in unexercisable options 
increases by 16.3 percent the odds of meeting or just beating analysts’ forecasts, while a one 
standard deviation increase in ownership increases by 30.5 percent the odds of meeting or just 
beating analysts’ forecasts.16 Also as expected, unexercisable options and ownership are 
negatively associated with the probability of missing analysts’ forecasts.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Although exercisable options are negatively correlated with the probability of missing 
analysts’ forecasts, they are not correlated with the probability of meeting or just beating 
analysts’ forecasts. This result is consistent with the trading evidence reported in the last section 
and with the argument that equity incentives lead to earnings management via future trading. 
Unlike unexercisable options and ownership, exercisable options are not correlated with future 
trading and are thus not correlated with earnings management in this test or our other analyses. 
Results for the control variables are generally consistent with those reported in prior 
research. Large firms are less likely to miss analysts’ forecasts and growth firms are more likely 
to meet or just beat analysts’ forecasts. Consistent with Barton and Simko (2002), firms with 
large net operating assets in the previous year are more likely to miss analysts’ forecasts. Firms 
with more outstanding shares, firms in high litigation industries, and firms with more implicit 
claims are more likely to meet or just beat analysts’ forecasts. Also, firms are more likely to meet 
or just beat analysts’ forecasts when more analysts provide forecasts or when there is greater 
consensus among forecasts. In contrast to the expectation management argument, firms with 
downward revisions are more likely to miss analysts’ forecasts than those without downward 
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revisions, but this result is consistent with analysts’ under-reaction to bad news, as documented 
in Abarbanell and Bernard (1992), because the downward revision can be due to underlying 
economic changes. 
To further investigate whether expectation management contributes to the reported results, 
we replicate the analyses using “old” consensus forecaststhe latest consensus forecast six 
months before the earnings announcement. These “old” forecasts are less subject to management 
guidance, which generally occurs in a short period before earnings announcements. If 
expectation management is driving the results, we should not observe similar patterns when we 
use “old” consensus forecasts. The results, not reported for the sake of brevity, are similar to 
those reported, suggesting that our results are mainly due to earnings management.17  
To summarize, the results presented in this section are consistent with H1. CEOs with high 
equity incentives are more likely to meet or just beat analysts’ forecasts and less likely to miss 
analysts’ forecasts, compared to those with low equity incentives.  
 
Earnings Management and Future Trading Conditional on Equity Incentives 
In this section, we investigate the impact of meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts on net 
sales separately for managers with high equity incentives and for those with low equity 
incentives. Observing more selling for managers with high equity incentives, who are more 
likely to manage earnings based on results reported above, suggests that managers increase sales 
after earnings management. 
To capture the differential selling, we first classify the sample into four groups based on 
aggregate equity incentives and earnings surprises:  
H_MB: firms with high equity incentives and meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts,  
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H_Miss: firms with high equity incentives and missing analysts’ forecasts,  
L_MB: firms with low equity incentives and meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts, 
L_Miss: firms with low equity incentives and missing analysts’ forecasts.  
We measure the aggregate equity incentives as the sum of unexercisable options, weighted by 
their hedge ratios as measured in Core and Guay (1999), and ownership; high (low) equity 
incentive managers are those with aggregate equity incentives higher (lower) than the sample 
median.  
We then include dummy variables that indicate each of the four groups into equation (1): 
jt,it,i4t,i3t,i2t,i1
t,i4t,i3t,i2t,i1jt,i
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+
−−−−+
+∆++++
+++=
ξγγγγ
ββββ
   (3) 
The coefficient on each dummy variable captures how much each group of firms sells in the 
future. The difference in coefficients, β1 - β2 (β3 - β4), indicates whether high (low) equity 
incentive managers sell more after meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts than after missing 
analysts’ forecasts.  
Table 4 reports the regression results. Coefficients on all dummy variables are significantly 
positive, suggesting that firms in each group are net sellers. As reported at the bottom of the 
table, the coefficient on H_MB is significantly higher than that on H_Miss, at the 0.05 level in 
the first six-month period and at the 0.08 level in the second six-month period. Thus, for high 
equity incentive managers, meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts leads to more net sales in the 
first year after earnings announcements than missing analysts’ forecasts. However, meeting or 
beating analysts’ forecasts does not appear to motivate low equity incentive managers to sell 
more: there is no significant difference between the coefficient on L_MB and that on L_Miss.18  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Overall, these results are consistent with high equity incentive managers increasing their 
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sales after earnings management. Doing so is beneficial if such earnings management can 
increase stock prices in the near term. In this sense, subsequent trading serves as the “exit 
strategy” for earnings management, thereby increasing the credibility of our earnings 
management evidence (Schipper 1989). 
 
V. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES  
Equity Incentives and Earnings Smoothing 
The evidence that managers with high equity incentives are more likely to report earnings 
that meet or just beat analysts’ forecasts is consistent with their incentives to manage earnings 
upward to avoid negative earnings surprises, as suggested by Stein (1989). At the same time, 
managers might have incentives to manage earnings downward in years with good performance 
to reserve for the future. Earnings smoothing is appealing in this context for at least two 
important reasons. First, it is difficult, if not impossible, for a firm to manage earnings upward 
consistently. By engaging in income-decreasing earnings management in years with good 
performance, managers can increase earnings as needed in the future. Such smoothing reduces 
the likelihood of missing analysts’ forecasts and increases the likelihood of meeting analysts’ 
forecasts in future periods. 
Second, equity incentives can be recurringmanagers with high equity incentives are more 
likely to have high equity incentives in the future. Unreported results indicate that equity 
incentives are positively serially correlated. Relatedly, as reported in Panel A of Table 5, equity 
incentives are positively correlated with managers’ sales in the second year after earnings 
announcements. (As before, exercisable options are not correlated with future trading.) Thus, 
managers with high equity incentives also care about stock prices in the future; if they cannot 
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meet analysts’ forecasts in the future, then they bear negative consequences. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
These discussions suggest that high equity incentive managers are likely to smooth 
earnings. One way to smooth earnings is to avoid large positive earnings surprises. By doing so, 
managers can reserve for the future and reduce the likelihood of missing analysts’ forecasts in 
the future. Thus, we expect a negative association between the incidence of large positive 
earnings surprises and equity incentives, and this negative association should be stronger for 
firms with persistent equity incentives, which arguably have stronger incentives to smooth 
earnings. We test these two predictions below.  
Equity incentives and avoiding large positive earnings surprises 
Column (1) of Panel B, Table 5 reports the logit regression results of the probability of 
large positive earnings surprises (i.e., earnings surprises equal to or greater than four cents) on 
equity incentives and control variables as in equation (2). The results are consistent with earnings 
smoothing. A one standard deviation increase in unexercisable options reduces by 14.3 percent 
the odds of having large positive earnings surprises, while a one standard deviation increase in 
ownership reduces by 11.6 percent the odds of having large positive earnings surprises. The 
results are similar if we use different cutoff points (such as three cents, five cents, or six cents) to 
measure large positive earnings surprises. Consistent with the future trading evidence, 
exercisable options are not negatively correlated with the probability of large positive earnings 
surprises. 
If reserving for the future is successful, equity incentives should be positively correlated 
with the probability of meeting or just beating analysts’ forecasts in the next year. Column (2) of 
Panel B reports the logit regression of meeting or just beating analysts’ forecasts in year t+1 on 
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equity incentives in year t. While the results for option holdings are insignificant, firms with high 
ownership are more likely to meet or just beat analysts’ forecasts in the next year, consistent with 
earnings smoothing.  
Earnings smoothing for firms with persistent equity incentives 
To test whether firms with persistent equity incentives are more likely to smooth earnings, 
we first rank all firm-years into three equal-sized groups: high, medium, or low, based on the 
aggregate equity incentive measurethe sum of unexercisable options, weighted by the hedge 
ratio as measured in Core and Guay (1999), and ownership. We then calculate the average 
ranking for each firm over the sample period. To increase the reliability of the classification, we 
only consider the 1,400 firms that have at least five years of data from ExecuComp over the 
eight-year period 1993-2000.  
If a firm’s average ranking is above the third quartile or below the first quartile of the 
average ranking distribution, this firm is regarded as having persistent equity incentives 
(consistently high or consistently low equity incentives, respectively). Under this approach, 56 
percent of the firm-years exhibit persistent equity incentives. We use a dummy variable, 
Recurring, to denote these firm-years.19 We then add an interaction of this dummy with equity 
incentives to the logit regression (equation 2) to capture the incremental effect for firms with 
persistent equity incentives. To simplify the analyses, we use the aggregate equity incentive 
measure (Total).  
The results are reported in Column (1) of Panel C, Table 5. As expected, equity incentives 
are negatively correlated with the probability of large positive earnings surprises only for firms 
with persistent equity incentives. That is, firms with persistent equity incentive measures are 
more likely to reserve for the future and those with less persistent equity incentives do not have 
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such incentives.  
In addition, we test whether managers with persistent equity incentives drive the results on 
meeting or just beating analysts’ forecasts reported in Table 3. In Column (2) of Panel C, we add 
an interaction between the recurring dummy and equity incentives in the logit regression of 
meeting or just beating analysts’ forecasts in the current period. The coefficient on the 
interaction term is insignificant, suggesting that equity incentives affect the likelihood of meeting 
or just beating analysts’ forecasts similarly for firms with persistent or non-persistent equity 
incentives. 
 
Equity Incentives and Earnings Management via Abnormal Accruals 
In this section, we investigate the relation between equity incentives and abnormal 
accruals, a commonly used proxy for earnings management. In this paper’s context, managers 
can benefit from income-increasing abnormal accruals. At the same time, the earnings smoothing 
incentives documented above imply income-decreasing abnormal accruals in years with good 
performance. Thus, ex ante, the direction of the correlation between equity incentives and 
abnormal accruals is unclear. If the incentive for increasing income dominates that for reserving 
for the future, the correlation is positive; otherwise, it is negative.  
Abnormal accruals are defined as the difference between total accruals and normal 
accruals. Normal accruals are estimated using the cross-sectional Jones (1991) model as 
described in DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994). Panel A of Table 6 describes the estimation method 
and reports the descriptive statistics on abnormal accruals. The mean and median abnormal 
accruals (scaled by beginning-of-period total assets) are 0.002 and 0.001, respectively. 
Untabulated statistics suggest that these numbers are insignificantly different from zero at the 
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0.05 level.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
Panel A also compares abnormal accruals and other firm characteristics between our 
sample and all Compustat firms with abnormal accruals. While there is no significant difference 
in abnormal accruals, the sample firms are larger and have better performance than the 
Compustat population. The average total assets are around $2 billion for the sample firms, but 
only $886 million for the Compustat population. Earnings and operating cash flow on average 
are five percent and 11.5 percent of beginning-of-period assets for the sample firms, but -10.8 
percent and -2.6 percent for the Compustat population. These differences are due to data 
restrictions on equity incentive measures and we control for both size and firm performance in 
the analyses.20 
Equity incentives and abnormal accruals 
We use the following regression to investigate the impact of equity incentives (Eq_Incent) 
on abnormal accruals:  
t,it,i8t,i71t,i6t,i5t,i4
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See Appendix A for variable measurement. In the regression, we control for factors that might 
affect abnormal accruals based on prior research. Positive accounting theory suggests that 
managers tend to manage earnings to decrease political costs (proxied by size), to relax debt 
covenants (the closeness to debt covenant violation is proxied by leverage), and to increase 
bonuses (Healy 1985; Watts and Zimmerman 1986; Sweeney 1994, among others).21 In addition, 
firms with high equity incentives are generally faster-growing and riskier (Lambert and Larcker 
1987; Murphy 1999), and Warfield et al. (1995) indicate that riskier and high growth firms have 
more abnormal accruals (which could be of either sign). Thus, we also control for the impact of 
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systematic risk and growth opportunities, and several other variables that might affect earnings 
management, as discussed in Section IV.  
The regression results are reported in Panel B of Table 6. Both unexercisable options and 
ownership are positively correlated with abnormal accruals, and exercisable options are not. 
These results suggest that on average, high equity incentive CEOs increase earnings via 
abnormal accruals.22 With respect to control variables, firms with high leverage, without a bonus 
plan, with high beginning-of-period net operating assets, in high litigation industries, and with 
high implicit claims take less positive abnormal accruals.  
We conduct additional analyses to assess the robustness of our results to possible 
measurement errors in abnormal accruals (Dechow et al. 1995; Bernard and Skinner 1996). First, 
because firms with extreme performance are more likely to have measurement errors, we add a 
control for firm performance (return on assets, i.e., ROA) or exclude firms with extreme earnings 
(top five percent, ten percent, or 20 percent based on |ROA| ranking). Second, we include 
unsystematic risk, earnings persistence, and earnings variability as explanatory variables to better 
control for the volatility of the firm’s economic environment or operations. Third, we replace 
abnormal accruals with inventory changes, which are shown to be used for earnings management 
purposes and are less subject to measurement errors than abnormal accruals (Thomas and Zhang 
2002). Our results are robust to these alternative specifications. 
Overall, these results suggest that CEOs with high equity incentives take more income-
increasing abnormal accruals than those with low equity incentives. That is, the incentive to 
increase earnings dominates that to reserve for the future in this particular sample. While this 
finding appears at odds with the earnings smoothing argument discussed above, additional 
analyses indicate that the results are largely driven by managers with less persistent equity 
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incentives, who are less concerned with accrual reversal and have fewer incentives to reserve for 
the future. When we split the sample based on the average ranking of equity incentives over the 
sample period, as discussed above, we find that equity incentives are not significantly correlated 
with abnormal accruals for firms with persistent equity incentives, but the correlation is 
significantly positive for firms with less persistent equity incentives. 
Abnormal accruals and future CEO trading  
Similar to analyzing the relation between meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts and future 
CEO trading, we also investigate the relation between abnormal accruals and future trading. 
Panel C of Table 6 reports regression results when abnormal accruals are added to equation (1). 
We add positive and negative abnormal accruals separately in the regression to detect any 
differential impact. The coefficients on positive abnormal accruals are significantly positive, and 
the coefficients on negative abnormal accruals are insignificant (marginally significantly 
negative in the second six-month period). These results are consistent with CEOs increasing 
sales after income-increasing abnormal accruals.23 
 
Other Sensitivity Tests 
Alternative measures of equity incentives 
We examine the robustness of our results to the measurement of equity incentives in 
several ways. First, in the main analysis, we implicitly assume that the hedge ratio of options is 
constant across firms. To relax this assumption, we explicitly measure the hedge ratio for 
individual firms, as done in Core and Guay (1999), and adjust the measurement of exercisable 
and unexercisable options accordingly (i.e., multiplying the option measures by the associated 
hedge ratio). Second, as argued in Baker and Hall (2004), if earnings management affects firm 
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value on a proportionate basis rather than on a dollar-for-dollar basis, a more appropriate 
measure is the dollar value of the incentive variable. Thus, we also use the magnitude of equity 
incentives, measured as the natural logarithm of one plus the change in the value of 
unexercisable options and ownership due to one percent increase in stock prices. The results 
based on these alternative equity incentive measures are similar to those reported.  
Lastly, we measure stock-based compensation as the ratio of stock grants and option grants 
(both in dollars) to the total compensation (the sum of salary, bonus, stock grants, option grants, 
long-term incentive payouts, and other compensation). This measure captures the proportion of 
CEOs’ compensation that is sensitive to stock prices. The results on this alternative measure, as 
reported in Panel A of Table 7, are consistent with earnings management behavior: stock-based 
compensation is positively correlated with the probability of meeting or just beating analysts’ 
forecasts. The results on other variables, including ownership, are similar to those from the main 
analyses. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
Analyses of future CEO trading conditional on future realized returns 
As discussed in Section II, one important reason for managers with high equity incentives 
to sell shares in the future is that their exposure to the idiosyncratic risk increases with stock 
prices, because the sensitivity of options to stock price increases, or because their wealth 
becomes more concentrated in their companies’ stocks, or both. If this is true, it follows that 
managers with the same equity incentives will sell more when stock prices increase more. To 
explicitly test this prediction, we add interactions between equity incentive measures and future 
realized returns into the future trading regressions. We use a dummy variable to capture large 
increases in stock prices; the dummy variable is one if the realized return in the period when net 
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sales are measured is in the top quartile. 
We report the results in Panel B of Table 7. Consistent with our prediction, the interactions 
of unexercisable options and ownership with the high return dummy have significantly positive 
coefficients, suggesting that managers sell more in the future due to equity incentives when stock 
prices increase dramatically than otherwise. These results lend further support to our argument 
on future trading motivated by equity incentives. 
Results for sub-periods  
To ensure that boom markets in late 1990s do not drive our results, we split the sample into 
two sub-samples: 1993-1996 and 1997-2000. The results in these two sub-samples are similar 
except that the impact of unexercisable options on net sales and earnings management, while 
significant in both sub-samples, is slightly stronger in later years than in earlier years. 
 
Alternative Explanations 
One might argue that our results on meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts are consistent 
with better firm performance attendant to the incentive alignment benefit of equity incentives. 
This alternative explanation is unlikely to drive our results for at least two reasons. First, 
financial analysts are generally regarded, and empirically confirmed, as sophisticated 
information intermediaries; thus, analysts arguably have incorporated into their forecasts the 
performance improvement due to equity incentives. If so, forecast errors should not be correlated 
with equity incentives. Second, better firm performance arising from incentive alignment 
benefits cannot explain the evidence that firms with high equity incentives are less likely to have 
large positive earnings surprises. Being less likely to have large positive earnings surprises is not 
a signal of good performance, but is consistent with our earnings smoothing argument.  
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Another alternative explanation relates to the possibility that our results are driven by 
equity incentives proxying for firm characteristics, such as growth, risk, or earnings volatility. In 
the main and sensitivity analyses, we explicitly control for these factors. Also, untabulated 
results indicate that firms with volatile earnings (high CV_AF) are less likely to meet or just beat 
analysts’ forecasts and more likely to have large positive earnings surprises, but the results on 
equity incentives are just the opposite. Furthermore, while both exercisable and unexercisable 
options are similarly related to firm characteristics (as shown in Appendix B), exercisable 
options, unlike unexercisable options as explained above, are not associated with future trading 
or earnings management measures. Such evidence suggests that omitted correlated variables are 
unlikely to drive our results.  
Finally, to control for industry characteristics (e.g., performance volatility and earnings 
informativeness) that might affect the level of equity incentives and the probability of meeting or 
just beating analysts’ forecasts, we replicate all analyses using an industry-demeaned equity 
incentive measure. To this end, we combine unexercisable options, weighted by their hedge 
ratios, with stock ownership and then deduct from this measure its mean in the industry-year 
level (industry is defined based on 3-digit SICs.) The inferences based on this measure are 
essentially the same. While we cannot completely rule out the possibility that these alternative 
explanations contribute to the reported results, we believe that our results are more consistent 
with earnings management induced by equity incentives rather than with these alternative 
explanations. 
 
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we examine the relation of equity incentivesbroadly defined as stock-based 
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compensation and stock ownershipwith managers’ future trading and earnings management. 
We first study the link between equity incentives and managers’ future trading. Based on all 
firm-years with available data over the 1993-2000 period, we find that high equity incentive 
managers are more likely to sell shares in the year after earnings announcements. This selling 
behavior is consistent with managers’ diversifying the increased risk arising from equity 
incentives, as argued in the paper, and/or with managers exploiting inside information on the 
pricing of their companies’ stocks. As stated by Michael Jensen, “Once a firm’s shares become 
overvalued, it is in managers’ interests to keep them that way, or to encourage even more 
overvaluation, in the hope of cashing out before the bubble bursts (The Economist 2002).” Thus, 
managers with high equity incentives could benefit from earnings management with the 
objective of keeping stock prices high and increasing the value of the shares to be sold in the 
future.  
We then test whether high equity incentive managers engage in earnings management by 
examining whether these managers are more likely to report earnings that meet or just beat 
analysts’ forecasts. The analyses indicate a significantly higher incidence of meeting or just 
beating analysts’ forecasts for managers with high equity incentives. Additional analyses 
document that managers with high equity incentives, especially those with consistently high 
equity incentives, are less likely to report large positive earnings surprises, consistent with 
earnings smoothing.  
Overall, our results suggest that stock-based compensation and ownership can lead to 
incentives for earnings management. If earnings management can increase short-term stock 
prices, managers can benefit from doing so by increasing the value of the shares they are going 
to sell. Results from additional analyses indicate that high equity incentive managers can even 
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gain more by selling more shares after reporting earnings that meet or beat analysts’ forecasts or 
after recognizing income-increasing abnormal accruals. Consequently, such earnings 
management behavior likely increases managers’ wealth at the expense of outside shareholders. 
Thus, this paper extends research on compensation-related opportunistic behavior, such as 
Aboody and Kasznik (2000).  
Our findings should be of interest to boards of directors contemplating compensation 
contracts for managers. While stock-based compensation and ownership can yield positive 
incentive effects, they can also have side effects, such as increased earnings management. An 
optimal compensation contract should reflect this trade-off. Our results also have implications 
for financial reporting regulators, who have criticized managers for focusing too much on short-
term performance targets, potentially to the detriment of earnings quality (Levitt 1998). Given 
the increased importance of stock-based compensation as a form of executive compensation and 
managerial ownership as an incentive alignment mechanism, our analyses indicate that 
regulatory responses to address opportunistic earnings management should consider incentives 
arising from stock-based compensation and ownership. 
 33
 
REFERENCES 
 
Abarbanell, J. S., and V. L. Bernard. 1992. Test of analysts’ overreaction/underreaction to earnings 
information as an explanation for anomalous stock price behavior. The Journal of Finance 47 (3): 
1182-1207. 
Aboody, D., and R. Kasznik. 2000. CEO stock option awards and timing of corporate voluntary 
disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Economics 29 (1): 73-100. 
Ali, A., and S. Kallapur. 2001. Securities price consequences of the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act of 1995 and related events. The Accounting Review 76 (3): 431-460. 
Baber, W. R., and S. H. Kang. 2002. The impact of split adjusting and rounding on analysts’ forecast 
error calculation. Accounting Horizons 16 (4): 277-289. 
Baker, G. P., and B. J. Hall. 2004. CEO incentives and firm size. Journal of Labor Economics 22 (4): 
767-798.  
Barton, J., and P. J. Simko. 2002. The balance sheet as an earnings management constraint. The 
Accounting Review 77 (Supplement): 1-27. 
Bartov, E., D. Givoly, and C. Hayn. 2002. The rewards to meeting or beating earnings expectations. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 33 (2): 173-204. 
Belsley, D. A., E. Kuh, and R. E. Welsch. 1980. Regression Diagnostics: Identifying Influential Data and 
Sources of Collinearity. John Wiley & Sons. 
Beneish, M. 1999. Incentives and penalties related to earnings overstatements that violate GAAP. The 
Accounting Review 74 (4): 425-457. 
Beneish, M. D., and M. Vargus. 2002. Insider trading, earnings quality, and accrual mispricing. The 
Accounting Review 77 (4): 755-791. 
Bernard, V. L., and D. J. Skinner. 1996. What motivates managers’ discretionary accruals? Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 22 (1-3): 313-325. 
Black, F., and M. Scholes. 1973. The pricing of options and corporate liabilities. Journal of Political 
Economy 81 (3): 637-654. 
Bowen, R. M., L. Ducharme, and D. Shores. 1995. Stakeholders’ implicit claims and accounting method 
choice. Journal of Accounting and Economics 20 (3): 255-295. 
Brown, L. D., and K. J. Kim. 1991. Timely aggregate analysts forecasts as better proxies for market 
earnings expectations. Journal of Accounting Research 29 (2): 382-385. 
Burgstahler, D. C., and M. J. Eames. 2003. Earnings management to avoid losses and earnings decreases: 
Are analysts fooled? Contemporary Accounting Research 20 (2): 253-294. 
Conference Board. 2002. Executive compensation: Principles, recommendations and specific best 
practice suggestions. Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprise: Findings and 
Recommendations. Conference Board, New York, NY (September 17, 2002). 
Core, J. E., and D. F. Larcker. 2002. Performance consequences of mandatory increases in executive 
stock ownership. Journal of Financial Economics 64 (3): 317-340. 
Core, J. E., and W. R. Guay. 1999. The use of equity grants to manage optimal equity incentive levels. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 28 (2): 151-184. 
 34
Dechow, P. M., and D. J. Skinner. 2000. Earnings management: Reconciling the views of accounting 
academics, practitioners, and regulators. Accounting Horizons 14 (2): 235-250.  
Dechow, P. M., R. G. Sloan, and A. P. Sweeney. 1995. Detecting earnings management. The Accounting 
Review 70 (2): 193-225. 
DeFond, M. L., and J. Jiambalvo. 1994. Debt covenant violation and manipulation of accruals: 
Accounting choice in troubled companies. Journal of Accounting and Economics 17 (1-2): 145-
176. 
Degeorge, F., J. Patel, and R. Zeckhauser. 1999. Earnings management to exceed thresholds. Journal of 
Business 72 (1): 1-35. 
The Economist. 2002. How to pay bosses. November 14, 2002. 
FASB. 2004. Share-based payment, an amendment of FASB Statements No. 123 and 95. Proposed 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards. (File Ref. 1102-100: March 31, 2004.) 
Fields, T. D., T. Z. Lys, and L. Vincent. 2001. Empirical research on accounting choices. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 31 (1-3): 255-307. 
Francis, J., D. Philbrick, and K. Schipper. 1994. Shareholder litigation and corporate disclosures. Journal 
of Accounting Research 32 (2): 137-164. 
Hanlon, M., S. Rajgopal, and T. Shevlin. 2003. Are executive stock options associated with future 
earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics 36 (1-3): 3-43.  
Healy, P. M. 1985. The impact of bonus schemes on the selection of accounting principles. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 7 (3): 85-107.  
Jensen, M. C., and K. J. Murphy. 1990. Performance pay and top-management incentives. Journal of 
Political Economy 98 (2): 225-264.  
Jensen, M. C., and W. H. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs, and 
ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3 (4): 305-360. 
Jones, J. 1991. Earnings management during import relief investigation. Journal of Accounting Research 
29 (2): 193-228. 
Kasznik, R. 1999. On the association between voluntary disclosure and earnings management. Journal of 
Accounting Research 37 (1): 57-82. 
Kasznik, R., and M. F. McNichols. 2002. Does meeting earnings expectations matter? Evidence from 
analyst forecast revisions and share prices. Journal of Accounting Research 40 (3): 727-759.  
Ke, B. 2001. Why do CEOs of publicly-traded firms prefer reporting small earning increases and long 
strings of consecutive earnings increases. Working paper. Penn State University.  
Ke, B., S. Huddart, and K. Petroni. 2003. What insiders know about future earnings and how they use it: 
Evidence from insider trades. Journal of Accounting and Economics 35 (3): 315-346. 
Knowledge at Wharton. 2003. Stock options: The end of the affair. http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu. 
Lakonishok, J., and I. Lee. 2001. Are insider trades informative? Review of Financial Studies 14 (1): 79-
111. 
Lambert, R. A., and D. F. Larcker. 1987. An analysis of the use of accounting and market measures of 
performance in executive compensation contracts. Journal of Accounting Research 25 
(Supplement): 85-129. 
 35
Levitt, A. 1998. The numbers game. Remarks by the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission delivered at the NYU Center for Law and Business, NY, September 28, 1998. 
Matsumoto, D. A. 2002. Management’s incentives to avoid negative earnings surprises. The Accounting 
Review 77 (3): 483-514. 
McNichols, M. F., and G. P. Wilson. 1988. Evidence of earnings management from the provision for bad 
debts. Journal of Accounting Research 26 (Supplement): 1-31. 
McVay, S., V. Nagar, and W. Tang. 2004. Stock incentives to meet earnings thresholds. Working paper. 
University of Michigan. 
Morck, R., A. Shleifer, and R.W. Vishny. 1988. Management ownership and market valuation: an 
empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics 20 (1-2): 293-315. 
Morgenson, G. 2003. The rules on bosses’ pay seem written with pencil. The New York Times. May 25, 
2003. 
Murphy, K. J. 1999. Executive compensation. Handbook of Labor Economics (Orley Ashenfleter and 
David Card eds.) North Holland: Amsterdam. 
Noe, C. F. 1999. Voluntary disclosures and insider transactions. Journal of Accounting and Economics 27 
(3): 305-326. 
O’Brien, P. C. 1988. Analysts’ forecasts as earnings expectations. Journal of Accounting and Economics 
10 (1): 53-83.  
Ofek, E., and D. Yermack. 2000. Taking stock: Equity-based compensation and the evolution of 
managerial ownership. The Journal of Finance 55 (3): 1367-1384. 
Payne, J. L., and S. W. G. Robb. 2000. Earnings management: The effect of ex-ante earnings 
expectations. Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance 15 (4): 371-392. 
Penman, S. H. 1982. Insider trading and the dissemination of firms’ forecast information. The Journal of 
Business 55 (4): 479-503. 
Rozeff, M. S., and M. A. Zaman. 1998. Overreaction and insider trading: Evidence from growth and 
value portfolios. The Journal of Finance 53 (2): 701-716. 
Schipper, K. 1989. Commentary on earnings management. Accounting Horizons 3 (4): 91-102. 
Seyhun, H. N. 1998. Investment intelligence from insider trading. The MIT Press.  
Sivakumar, K., and G. Waymire. 1994. Insider trading following material news events: Evidence from 
earnings. Financial Management 23 (1): 23-32. 
Skinner, D. J., and R. G. Sloan. 2002. Earnings surprises, growth expectations, and stock returns or don’t 
let an earnings torpedo sink your portfolio. Review of Accounting Studies 7 (2-3): 289-312. 
Skinner, D. J., and L. Myers. 2000. Earnings momentum and earnings management. Working paper. 
University of Michigan.  
Sloan, R. G. 1996. Do stock prices fully reflect information in accruals and cash flows about future 
earnings? The Accounting Review 71 (3): 289-315. 
Stein, J. C. 1989. Efficient capital markets, inefficient firms: A model of myopic corporation behavior. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 104 (4): 655-669. 
Summers, S., and J. Sweeney. 1998. Fraudulently misstated financial statements and insider trading: An 
empirical analysis. The Accounting Review 73 (1): 131-146. 
 36
Sweeney, A. P. 1994. Debt-covenant violations and managers’ accounting response. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 17 (3): 281-308. 
Thomas, J., and H. Zhang. 2002. Inventory changes and future returns. Review of Accounting Studies 7 
(2-3): 163-187. 
Warfield, T. D., J. J. Wild, and K. L. Wild. 1995. Managerial ownership, accounting choices, and 
informativeness of earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics 20 (1): 61-91. 
Watts, R. L., and J. L. Zimmerman. 1986. Positive Accounting Theory. Prentice Hall. Englewood Cliffs. 
NJ. 
Xie, H. 2001. The mispricing of abnormal accruals. The Accounting Review 76 (3): 357-373.  
 
 37
 
                                                          
1 Dechow and Skinner (2000) also express concerns that when stock market valuations are high, managers have 
incentives to maintain or even increase those valuations, probably via earnings management.  
 
2 In our main analyses, we focus on CEOs because they are the ultimate decision-makers. Results based on all 
managers with data available are similar. 
 
3 Concurrent research by McVay et al. (2004) examines insider trading following meeting and beating analysts’ 
forecasts. Unlike this paper, McVay et al. do not examine ex-ante incentives for earnings management resulting 
from stock-based compensation or ownership. 
 
4 If managers’ equity incentive levels are lower than the equilibrium level, they can purchase shares from the open 
market. Some firms explicitly specify the target stock ownership for CEOs to facilitate incentive alignment (Core 
and Larcker 2002).  
 
5 One can formally derive this result from examining the Black-Scholes formula. The intuition is as follows. The 
hedge ratio of an option equals the probability that the option is in the money when it is exercisable. (The hedge 
ratio of an in-the-money exercisable option is one.) Since the probability for an option to be in the money when it is 
exercisable increases with stock prices, its hedge ratio increases with stock prices.  
 
6 While the efficient market assumption posits that managers cannot fool investors with earnings management, 
extant empirical evidence suggests otherwise. For example, Kasznik (1999) finds that earnings management can 
help companies avoid market penalties associated with missing earnings targets. Sloan (1996) and Xie (2001), 
among others, suggest that the capital markets mis-price accruals, especially abnormal accruals, consistent with 
earnings management influencing stock prices. See Fields et al. (2002) for additional discussion of the pricing 
effects of earnings management. As discussed below, incentives for earnings management exist in our setting even if 
on average earnings management cannot affect stock prices. 
 
7 Incentives to manage earnings are reduced by the associated costs, such as those arising from audit qualifications, 
SEC enforcement sanctions, or management reputation effects. In this paper, we first assume that the costs of 
earnings management are not correlated with equity incentives and thus do not affect our prediction. In Section V, 
we discuss the possibility that certain costs of earnings managementits impact on the value of managers’ equity 
holdings in the futurevary with equity incentives and explicitly test the implications of this possibility. 
 
8 Although ExecuComp started coverage in 1992, the coverage is lower in 1992 than in other years. Thus, including 
1992 data, while yielding similar results, might introduce a sample selection bias. 
 
9 Baker and Hall (2004) analyze the conditions under which alternative proxies for managers’ equity incentives are 
valid. In brief, equity incentive proxies measured in proportion to firm value are most appropriate when managers’ 
actions affect firm value on a dollar-to-dollar basis (e.g., purchasing a corporate jet). Thus, if the earnings 
management activities affect firm value on a dollar-to-dollar basis, instead of on a proportional basis (e.g., a 
corporate reorganization), the ratio measure we use is appropriate. Otherwise, a measure based on the magnitude of 
equity incentives is appropriate. We examine alternative measurements of equity incentives as part of our sensitivity 
tests reported later.  
 
10 This restriction increases the power of the tests but reduces the sample by about 25 percent. Relaxing this 
restriction does not affect the inferences. 
 
11 Excluding options exercised from the calculation of net sales does not affect the inferences.  
 
12 Baber and Kang (2002) find that analysts’ forecast data in I/B/E/S or First Call are subject to split adjustment bias; 
because these databases adjust stock splits retrospectively and split-adjusted data are rounded to the nearest cent, the 
probability of zero or one cent forecast errors might be overstated. While the impact of this split-adjustment bias on 
our results is unclear ex ante, we replicate our analyses on observations without stock splits in the sample period (61 
percent of the sample). The results are essentially the same. 
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13 While Ofek and Yermack (2000) study the relation between stock/option grants and contemporaneous insider 
sales, they do not examine future insider sales. Nor do they study option/stock ownership. 
 
14 In all analyses, we also include year dummies to control for potential year-specific effects. Throughout the paper, 
outliers, defined as observations with an absolute value of the R-student measure greater than three, are excluded. 
None of the regressions are subject to multicollinearity based on the diagnostics in Belsley et al. (1980). 
 
15 For example, suppose that the hedge ratio of options is 0.6 when granted (the sample average reported in Jensen 
and Murphy 1990). Managers might sell shares to diversify the increase in risk (0.6 × number of options) when they 
are awarded options and sell more shares [(1-0.6) × number of options] before these options become exercisable. 
 
16 The odds of an event are the ratio of the probability that this event occurs to the probability that this event does 
not occur. For example, the odds of meeting or just beating analysts’ forecasts are the ratio of the probability that a 
firm meets or just beats analysts’ forecasts to the probability of the firm having earnings surprises other than zero or 
one cent. The odds are a positive function of the probability that the event occurs. We interpret the results based on 
the change in the odds because this measure is a function of the coefficient in the logit regressions only. In contrast, 
calculating the change in the probability requires a reference point.  
 
17 The overall weak results on expectation management are consistent with its ambiguous net effect on stock prices. 
Managers can benefit from the guidance if the stock price is higher after (1) managing analysts’ forecasts downward 
(and presumably resulting in a lower price) and (2) meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts later. If managers are 
uncertain whether the upward impact of meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts outweighs the downward impact of 
guidance, they are likely not to use this tool.  
 
18 A formal F-test indicates that (β1 - β2) - (β3 - β4) is significantly different from zero. 
 
19 The results are similar if we exclude firm-years with consistently low equity incentives. 
 
20 ExceuComp covers companies within the S&P 1500 (the combination of the S&P 500 index, the S&P MidCap 
400 index, and the S&P SmallCap 600 index). In addition to size requirements, companies must have positive 
earnings (excluding discontinued operations and extraordinary items) to be included in these indexes. 
  
21 To reduce the burden of data collection, details of bonus plans are not exploited in this study. Instead, we use a 
dummy variable to indicate firm-years with non-zero bonus. We find similar results when using alternative measures 
of bonus, including a dummy variable based on the ranking of return on assets as used in McNichols and Wilson 
(1988) and Bowen et al. (1995) and the ratio of cash bonus over total compensation. We also estimate the 
regressions after excluding the bonus variable and find similar results on equity incentive variables. 
 
22 Warfield et al. (1995) find a negative association between managerial ownership and the absolute value of 
abnormal accruals. Unlike Warfield et al., we focus on the relation between all equity incentive elements and signed 
abnormal accruals. Thus, one should be careful in comparing our results with those of Warfield et al. 
 
23 Further analyses (not reported for the sake of brevity) indicate that managers taking more negative abnormal 
accruals sell more in the second year after earnings announcements, presumably after the reversal of abnormal 
accruals. This result is consistent with managers postponing sales if they take negative abnormal accruals. 
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APPENDIX A  
Variable Measurement  
 
Variables Measurement 
A. Equity incentives  
Eq_Incenti,t = Equity incentives are measured in shares during or at the end of fiscal year t, scaled by the 
number of outstanding shares; this measure includes five components: option grants, 
unexercisable options (excluding option grants), exercisable options, restricted stock 
grants, and ownership. Unless noted, restricted stock grants are combined with ownership 
and option grants are combined with other unexercisable options. 
B. Future net sales  
NetSalei,t+j = CEO’s net sales (in dollars) in the jth six-month period after the earnings announcement 
for fiscal year t, scaled by the market value at the end of fiscal year t, where j=1 and 2, and 
net sales = open market sales - (open market purchases + options exercised). 
C. Earnings surprises  
Surprisei,t = The difference between actual earnings and the latest consensus forecast before earnings 
announcements, both of which are measured on a per-share basis and are collected from 
First Call; it is rounded to the nearest cent; 
D_MBi,t = The meeting or just beating dummy variable, one if earnings surprises are zero or one 
cent, and zero otherwise. 
D. Abnormal accruals  
Abnormal Accrualsi,t = Abnormal accruals estimated from the modified cross-sectional Jones (1991) model (see 
Panel A of Table 6 for the estimation details). 
E. Factors affecting future net sales  
Sizei,t = Natural logarithm of market value (in million dollars) at the end of fiscal year t;  
Growthi,t = The book-to-market ratio at the end of fiscal year t;  
Reti,t = Buy and hold raw return in the 12 months prior to the earnings announcement for fiscal 
year t;  
∆OCFi,t = Change in operating cash flow in year t, scaled by total assets at the beginning of year t. 
F. Factors affecting earnings surprises  
Sizei,t and growthi,t-1 as measured in group E. 
Sales_Growthi,t = Sales for fiscal year t divided by sales for fiscal year t-1; 
NOAi,t-1 = Net operating assets (i.e., shareholders’ equity minus cash and marketable securities, plus 
total debt) at the end of fiscal year t-1, scaled by sales for fiscal year t-1;  
Sharesi,t = Number of common shares outstanding at the end of fiscal year t; 
Litigationi,t = One if the firm is in one of the following industries: pharmaceutical / biotechnology (SIC 
codes 2833-2836, 8731-8734), computer (3570-3577, 7370-7374), electronics (3600-
3674), or retail (5200-5961), zero otherwise;  
ImplicitClaimi,t = Proxied by labor intensity, calculated as one minus the ratio of gross PPE to total assets at 
the end of fiscal year t; 
Num_Estimatei,t = Number of analysts whose forecasts are included in the consensus forecast used to 
calculate earnings surprise; 
CV_AFi,t = Coefficient of variation (standard deviation scaled by the mean) of the consensus forecast 
used to calculate earnings surprise; 
Down_Revi,t = One if at least one of the firm’s analysts revised his or her forecast downward in the three 
months prior to the earnings announcement for fiscal year t, zero otherwise. 
G. Factors affecting abnormal accruals  
Sizei,t and growthi,t as measured in group E, NOAi,t, Litigationi,t, and ImplicitClaimi,t as measured in group F. 
Leveragei,t = Long-term debt divided by total assets, both at the end of fiscal year t;  
Bonusi,t = One for firm-years whose CEOs have nonzero bonus, and zero otherwise;  
Riski,t = Market beta in fiscal year t estimated from weekly returns. 
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APPENDIX B  
Correlations Between Variables 
 
This appendix reports Spearman correlations between key variables used in various analyses. Correlations between all variables, except for those noted below, 
are based on the sample used in earnings surprise analyses, 4,301 firm-years. Correlations between net sales or stock returns and other variables are based on the 
sample used in future trading analyses, 2,723 firm-years. Correlations between leverage or risk and other variables are based on the sample used in abnormal 
accrual analyses, 6,387 firm-years. If two variables are not included in the same analysis, we do not report their correlation and use “NA” to denote such 
occasions. If all correlations in a column or a row are not reported, this column or this row is dropped from the table. See Appendix A for variable measurement. 
All correlations, except those denoted with “#”, are significant at the 0.05 level or lower. 
 
 
Net 
sales * D_MB 
Abnormal 
accruals 
Unexercisable 
options Ownership 
Exercisable 
options Size Growth 
Net 
operating 
assets Litigation 
Implicit 
Claim CV_AF Leverage 
Abnormal accruals 0.005# 0.035            
Unexercisable options 0.073 0.037 0.021#           
Ownership 0.193 0.049 0.030 0.050          
Exercisable options -0.040# -0.027# 0.003# 0.472 -0.011#         
Size 0.084 0.140 -0.003# -0.209 -0.343 -0.243        
Growth -0.282 -0.194 -0.070 0.026 -0.025 0.108 -0.407       
Stock returns 0.269 NA -0.019# 0.071 0.019# -0.003# 0.209 -0.368      
Net operating assets NA -0.030 -0.012# -0.027 -0.132 0.036 0.051 0.218      
Litigation NA 0.120 -0.008# 0.068 0.097 0.037 0.057 -0.194 -0.201     
Implicit Claim NA 0.084 0.017# 0.138 0.106 0.088 -0.025 -0.153 -0.211 0.135    
CV_AF NA -0.203 -0.151 -0.005# 0.093 0.009# -0.196 0.177 0.073 0.070 -0.058   
Down_Rev NA -0.001# 0.004# -0.063 -0.100 -0.048 0.070 0.027 0.104 -0.047 -0.071 0.081  
Leverage NA -0.036 0.032 -0.148 0.090 0.002# 0.194 -0.036 0.353 -0.261 -0.271 NA  
Risk NA -0.022# 0.066 0.035 -0.010# 0.141 -0.199 -0.022 -0.067 0.238 0.119 NA -0.133 
 
* For the sake of brevity, we only report the correlations between net sales in the 1st six-month period after earnings announcements and other variables. The 
correlations between net sales in the 2nd six-month period and other variables are similar.
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FIGURE 1 
Theoretical Links  
 
This figure depicts the theoretical constructs and the links between them. For each theoretical construct, we list 
empirical proxies used in the analyses. Tests of Link 1 comprise our main analyses, in which we investigate whether 
high equity incentive managers are more likely to manage earnings. While we primarily rely on prior research to 
establish Link 3, we test Link 2 to verify that high equity incentive managers sell more in the future.  
  
 
 
 
 
Equity incentives 
Proxies: 
Option grants, unexercisable options, 
exercisable options, stock grants, 
stock ownership 
Future manager trading  
Proxies: 
Net sales of shares in the future 
Link 1
Link 2 Link 3
Earnings management 
Proxies: 
Meeting or just beating analysts’ forecasts 
Large positive earnings surprises 
Abnormal accruals 
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FIGURE 2  
The Dynamics of Equity Incentives 
 
This figure uses T-accounts to depict the relation between various components of equity incentives, and the relation between equity incentives and manager 
trading (i.e., open market purchases, options exercised, and open market sales). BB denotes beginning balance and EB denotes ending balance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unexercisable options 
BB 
EB 
Option grants 
Options vest 
Exercisable options
BB
EB
Options vest
Options exercised Open market sales
Stock ownership
BB
EB
Open market purchases
Options exercised
Restricted stock grants
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FIGURE 3 
Timing of Variable Measurement 
 
This figure describes the timeline when the three sets of variables of interest are measured. In brief, equity 
incentives are measured before earnings management proxies (earnings surprises and abnormal accruals), which are 
based on the information disclosed at earnings announcements. Managers’ trading is measured after earnings 
announcements.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fiscal year t, 
when option grants and 
stock grants are measured 
Fiscal-year-end of year t, 
when unexercisable options, 
exercisable options, and 
ownership are measured 
One year after the earnings 
announcement for fiscal year t, when 
managers’ trading is measured 
Earnings announcement 
for fiscal year t, when 
earnings management 
proxies are measured 
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TABLE 1  
Descriptive Statistics on Equity Incentives, CEOs’ Trading, and Earnings Surprises 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics on CEOs’ equity incentives 
The descriptive statistics are based on 9,472 firm-years with ownership higher than option and stock grants in the 
period 1993-2000. Equity incentive measures (in shares) are scaled by total outstanding shares of the firm. 
 Mean Std. Median 
Option grants (%) 0.163 0.309 0.051 
Unexercisable options (excluding option grants) (%) 0.254 0.429 0.078 
Exercisable options (%) 0.637 0.932 0.295 
Restricted stock grants (%)* 0.008 0.031 0.000 
Ownership (%) 4.184 7.602 0.825 
* Due to its small magnitude, we do not analyze restricted stock grants separately from ownership in the following 
analyses.  
 
Panel B: Spearman correlations between equity incentive measures 
The correlations are based on 9,472 firm-years with ownership higher than option and stock grants in the period 
1993-2000. Equity incentive measures (in shares) are scaled by total outstanding shares of the firm. All correlations 
are significant at the 0.05 level or better. 
 
Option 
grants 
Unexercisable options 
(excluding option grants) 
Exercisable 
options 
Unexercisable options (excluding option grants) 0.210   
Exercisable options  0.366 0.432  
Ownership 0.163 0.034 0.101 
 
Panel C: CEOs’ net sales in the year after the earnings announcement 
The descriptive statistics are based on all firm-years in the period 1993-2000 with both equity incentives and net 
sales in a specific period after the earnings announcement.  
  In million dollars  As percentage of market value 
 N Mean Std. Median  Mean Std. Median 
1st six-month 2,830 2.358 11.115 0.065  0.225 1.325 0.008 
2nd six-month 2,411 2.055  9.596 0.009  0.249 1.448 0.004 
 
Panel D: Number of observations in each earnings surprise cell 
Earnings surprise per share is measured as the difference between actual earnings and the latest consensus forecast 
before earnings announcement. The sample includes 4,301 firm-years with equity incentives and earnings surprises 
in the period 1993-2000. 
Earnings surprise (cents) N   Earnings surprise (cents) N
   0 1,057
-1 379   1 746
-2 174   2 448
-3 94   3 271
-4 71   4 176
Less than -5 352   Greater than 5 533
 45
TABLE 2  
Equity Incentives and Net Sales in the Future 
 
This table reports the results from regressing CEOs’ net sales (%) in the two six-month periods after earnings 
announcements on equity incentive measures (%) and control variables: 
jt,it,i4t,i3t,i2t,i1t,i0jt,i OCFRetGrowthSizeIncentEqNetSale +−+ +∆+++++= ξγγγγγ β  ,  (1) 
where j = 1 or 2, denotes the jth six-month period after the earnings announcement. See Appendix A for variable 
measurement. Year dummies are included to control for year fixed effects. The regressions are estimated on all firm-
years with data available in the sample period 1993-2000. The p-values in parentheses are based on one-sided t-tests. 
 
  
Predicted 
signs 1st six-month 2nd six-month 
Equity incentives    
Option grants + 0.112 0.045 
  (0.001) (0.014) 
Unexercisable options  + 0.091 0.101 
(excluding option grants)  (0.001) (0.001) 
Ownership + 0.016 0.014 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
Exercisable options + -0.013 0.015 
  (0.862) (0.159) 
Control variables    
Size - -0.027 -0.035 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
Growth - -0.229 -0.191 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
Stock returns + 0.135 0.099 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
Change in cash flow + -0.058 -0.174 
  (0.712) (0.916) 
 
N  2,723 2,316 
Adj. R2  0.110 0.068 
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TABLE 3  
Equity Incentives and Meeting or Just Beating Analysts’ Forecasts  
The table reports the change in the odds of firms (1) missing analysts’ forecasts, or (2) meeting or just beating 
analysts’ forecasts by one cent, due to a change of one standard deviation of a continuous variable or from zero to 
one for a dummy variable, and the p-value (in parentheses) of the corresponding coefficient in the logit regressions. 
)RevDownAFCVEstimateNum
mplicitClaiImLitigationSharesNOA
GrowthSalesGrowthSize
IncentEq(logit)Surprise(Prob
t,it,ik,10t,ik,9t,ik,8
t,ik,7t,ik,6t,ik,51t,ik,4
t,ik,31t,ik,2t,ik,1
t,ikk,0kt,i
ζγγγ
γγγγ
γγγ
γ
++++
++++
+++
+=Φ∈
−−−
−
−−
−β
 (2) 
Surprisei,t is earnings surprises per share; Φ could be one of the following two sets of earnings surprises: (1) 
negative earnings surprises; (2) zero or one cent. See Appendix A for variable measurement. Year dummies are 
included to control for year fixed effects. The logit regressions are based on 4,301 firm-years with all required data 
in the period 1993-2000.  
  
Negative earnings surprises 
Φ=(-∞, 0) 
(1) 
Meeting or just beating analysts’ forecasts
Φ=[$0, $0.01] 
(2) 
  
Predicted 
signs  
Change in the odds 
(p-value) 
Predicted 
signs  
Change in the odds 
(p-value) 
Equity incentives      
Unexercisable options  - -0.159 + 0.163 
   (0.001)  (0.001) 
Ownership  - -0.224 + 0.305 
   (0.001)  (0.001) 
Exercisable options  - -0.098 + -0.043 
   (0.020)  (0.262) 
Control variables      
Size  ? -0.352 ? 0.032 
   (0.001)  (0.607) 
Growth  + -0.090 - -0.243 
   (0.031)  (0.001) 
Sales_Growth  - -0.194 + -0.033 
   (0.001)  (0.353) 
Net operating assets (NOA)  + 0.100 - 0.025 
   (0.019)  (0.527) 
Shares  - 0.016 + 0.309 
   (0.802)  (0.001) 
Litigation  - -0.083 + 0.589 
   (0.319)  (0.001) 
Implicit Claim  - -0.063 + 0.187 
   (0.104)  (0.001) 
Num_Estimate  - -0.121 + 0.242 
   (0.024)  (0.001) 
CV_AF  + 0.496 - -0.733 
   (0.001)  (0.001) 
Down_Rev  - 7.939 + 0.980 
   (0.001)  (0.811) 
 
Psudo R2   0.195 
 
0.180 
Likelihood ratio   603  612 
(p-value)   (0.001)  (0.001) 
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TABLE 4 
The Impact of Meeting or Beating Analysts’ Forecasts on CEOs’ Net Sales  
Conditional on Equity Incentives 
 
This table reports results from regressing future net sales (%) on four dummy variables, H_MB, H_Miss, L_MB, and 
L_Miss, and control variables:  
jt,it,i4t,i3t,i2t,i1
t,i4t,i3t,i2t,i1jt,i
OCFRetGrowthSize
MissLMBLMissHMBHNetSale
+
−−−−+
+∆++++
+++=
ξγγγγ
ββββ
 ,   (3) 
where j = 1 or 2, denotes the jth six-month period after the earnings announcement, and the four dummy variables are 
defined as follows: 
H_MB = one if the firm has high equity incentives and meets or beats analysts’ forecasts, 
H_Miss = one if the firm has high equity incentives and misses analysts’ forecasts, 
L_MB = one if the firm has low equity incentives and meets or beats analysts’ forecasts, and 
L_Miss = one if the firm has low equity incentives and misses analysts’ forecasts. 
High or low equity incentives are classified based on the sample median of an aggregate equity incentive measure, 
which is the sum of unexercisable options, weighted by their hedge ratios as measured in Core and Guay (1999), and 
ownership. See Appendix A for the measurement of other variables. Year dummies are included to control for year 
fixed effects. The regressions are estimated on all firm-years with data available in the period 1993-2000. The p-
values in parentheses are based on one-sided t-tests. The table also reports the difference in coefficients between 
H_MB and H_Miss, that between L_MB and L_Miss, and the p-value of the corresponding F-tests. 
 
  
Predicted  
signs 1st six-month 2nd six-month 
H_MB (β1) + 0.620 0.567 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
H_Miss (β2) + 0.534 0.500 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
L_MB (β3) + 0.469 0.414 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
L_Miss (β4) + 0.419 0.410 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
 
Control variables  Yes Yes 
N  1,637 1,389 
Adj. R2  0.168 0.158 
 
The impact of meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts on net sales (p-value) 
For high equity incentive managers (β1-β2) + 0.086 0.067 
  (0.054) (0.077) 
For low equity incentive managers (β3-β4) + 0.050 0.004 
  (0.186) (0.908) 
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TABLE 5  
Equity Incentives and Earnings Smoothing  
 
Panel A: Equity incentives and CEOs’ trading in the second year after earnings announcements 
 
This panel reports the results from regressing CEOs’ net sales (%) in the second year (the 3rd and 4th six-month 
periods) after earnings announcements on equity incentive measures (%) and control variables: 
jt,it,i4t,i3t,i2t,i1t,i0jt,i OCFRetGrowthSizeIncentEqNetSale +−+ +∆+++++= ξγγγγγ β  ,  (1) 
where j = 3 or 4, denotes the jth six-month period after the earnings announcement. See Appendix A for variable 
measurement. The regressions are estimated on all firm-years with data available in the period 1993-2000. Year 
dummies are included to control for year fixed effects. The p-values in parentheses are based on one-sided t-tests. 
 
  
Predicted 
signs 3rd six-month 4th six-month 
Equity incentives    
Unexercisable options  + 0.076 0.068 
  (0.002) (0.011) 
Ownership + 0.021 0.019 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
Exercisable options + 0.030 -0.002 
  (0.144) (0.538) 
Control variables    
Size - -0.037 -0.048 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
Growth - -0.233 -0.256 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
Stock returns + 0.052 0.079 
  (0.026) (0.007) 
Change in cash flow + 0.128 -0.191 
  (0.790) (0.133) 
 
N  2,213 1,624 
Adj. R2  0.085 0.086 
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TABLE 5 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Equity incentives and earnings smoothing  
 
This panel reports the change in the odds of firms (1) beating analysts’ forecasts by at least four cents in the current 
year, and (2) meeting or just beating analysts’ forecasts by one cent in the next year, due to a change of one standard 
deviation of a continuous variable, and the p-value (in parentheses) of the corresponding coefficient in the logit 
regressions. See Table 3 for model specifications and Appendix A for variable measurement. Year dummies are 
included to control for year fixed effects.  Column (1) is based on current year’s earnings surprises (Surprisei,t) and 
Column (2) is based on the next year’s earnings surprises (Surprisei,t+1). Surprisei,t+1 is the difference between First 
Call actual EPS for year t+1 and the latest consensus forecast for year t+1 disclosed before the earnings 
announcement for year t+1, rounded to the nearest cent. 
 
  
The probability of  
large positive earnings surprises 
in the current year 
Prob(Surprisei,t ≥$0.04) 
(1)  
The probability of  
meeting or just beating analysts’ forecasts 
in the next year 
Prob(Surprisei,t+1 =$0 or $0.01) 
(2) 
  
Predicted 
signs  
Change in the odds 
(p-value)  
Predicted 
signs  
Change in the odds 
(p-value) 
Equity incentives       
Unexercisable options  - -0.143  + 0.041 
   (0.002)   (0.339) 
Ownership  - -0.116  + 0.167 
   (0.013)   (0.001) 
Exercisable options  - 0.152  + -0.064 
   (0.005)   (0.116) 
 
Control variables   Yes   Yes 
N   4,301   3,429 
Psudo R2   0.150   0.135 
Likelihood ratio   397   291 
(p-value)   (0.001)   (0.001) 
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TABLE 5 (continued) 
 
Panel C: The incremental impact of persistent equity incentives on earnings smoothing 
 
This panel reports the incremental impact of persistent equity incentives on earnings surprises: the probability of 
large positive earnings surprises in Column (1) and the probability of meeting or just beating analysts’ forecasts in 
Column (2), using the following regression: 
)ControlsoptionseExercisabl
RecurringTotalTotal(logit)Surprise(Prob
t,it,ikt,ik,3
it,ik,2t,ik,1k,0kt,i
ζβ
ββγ
+++
×++=Φ∈
γ  , 
where Controls are those included in equation (2). The table reports the change in the odds due to a change of one 
standard deviation of a variable and the p-value (in parentheses) of the corresponding coefficient in the logit 
regressions. The aggregate equity incentive measure, Total, is the sum of unexercisable options, weighted by the 
hedge ratio as measured in Core and Guay (1999), and ownership. To identify firms with persistent equity 
incentives, we first rank all firm-years into three equal-sized groups: high, medium, or low, based on the aggregate 
equity incentive measure. We then calculate the average ranking for each firm over the sample period. If a firm’s 
average ranking is above the 3rd quartile or below the 1st quartile of the average ranking distribution, this firm is 
regarded as having persistent equity incentives (consistently high or consistently low equity incentives, 
respectively); for these firms, the dummy variable, Recurring, is defined as one, and zero otherwise. See Appendix 
A for the measurement of other variables. Year dummies are included to control for year fixed effects. The logit 
regressions are based on 3,958 firm-years with all required data in the period 1993-2002. 
 
  
Large positive earnings surprises 
Φ=[$0.04, ∞) 
 (1)  
Meeting or just beating analysts’ forecasts 
Φ=[$0, $0.01] 
(2) 
  
Predicted 
signs  
Change in the odds 
(p-value)  
Predicted 
signs  
Change in the odds 
(p-value) 
Total  ? 0.024  + 0.262 
   (0.760)   (0.001) 
Total × Recurring  - -0.218  ? 0.038 
   (0.001)   (0.509) 
Exercisable options  ? 0.063  ? 0.002 
   (0.233)   (0.961) 
 
Control variables   Yes   Yes 
Psudo R2   0.164   0.198 
Likelihood ratio   368   577 
(p-value)   (0.001)   (0.001) 
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TABLE 6  
Equity Incentives and Earnings Management via Abnormal Accruals 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics on abnormal accruals and other firm characteristics  
 
  
The sample 
(N=6,867)  
Compustat population 
(N=50,984) 
  Mean Median 
Inter-quartile 
range  Mean Median 
Inter-quartile  
range 
Abnormal accruals  0.002 0.001 0.086  0.007 0.006 0.141 
Total assets ($million)  2,028 624 1,537  886 66 310 
Earnings  0.050 0.068 0.087  -0.108 0.026 0.196 
Operating cash flows  0.115 0.113 0.111  -0.026 0.056 0.191 
 
All variables, except total assets, are deflated by beginning-of-period total assets. The descriptive statistics for the 
sample are based on all firm-years with both equity incentives and abnormal accruals in the period 1993-2000. The 
Compustat population includes all firm-years in the same period with abnormal accruals. Abnormal accruals are 
defined as the difference between total accruals and normal accruals. Normal accruals are estimated using the cross-
sectional Jones (1991) model as described in DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994). In this model, normal accruals are 
estimated as a function of change in revenues and level of property, plant and equipment: 
TAi,t /Ai,t-1=b0(1/ Ai,t-1)+b1(∆REVi,t / Ai,t-1)+b2(PPEi,t / Ai,t-1)+µ i,t 
Where: 
TAi,t = total accruals, i.e., income before extraordinary items (#18) minus operating cash flows (#308); 
Ai,t-1 = beginning-of-period total assets (#6); 
∆REVi,t = change in net revenues (#12) from year t-1 to year t, included to control for normal changes in 
working capital; 
PPEi,t = gross property, plant and equipment (#7), included to control for normal depreciation expense; 
µi,t = error term; 
i,t = subscript for firm i in year t. 
The portion of total accruals that is not explained by normal operating activities, i.e., the residual µi,t, is the estimate 
of abnormal accruals. Because operating characteristics might vary across industries and years, the estimation is 
conducted for each industry-year combination, based on all firm-years with data available from Compustat. Industry 
is defined on the basis of two-digit SICs and industry-year combinations with less than 7 observations are deleted.  
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TABLE 6 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Regressions of abnormal accruals on equity incentive measures and control variables 
 
This panel reports the coefficients and the accompanying p-value of the following regression: 
t,it,i8t,i71t,i6t,i5t,i4
t,i3t,i2t,i1t,i0t,i
ClaimImplicitLitigationNOAGrowthRisk
BonusLeverageSizeIncentEqAccrualsAbnormal
ςγγγγγ
γγγγ
++++++
++++=
−
−β   
(4) 
This regression is estimated using the pooled sample with year dummies to control for year fixed effects. See 
Appendix A for variable measurement. The p-values in parentheses are based on two-sided t-tests. 
 
   
Abnormal  
accruals 
Equity incentives   
Unexercisable options  0.695 
  (0.012) 
Ownership  0.070 
  (0.001) 
Exercisable options  0.140 
  (0.407) 
Control variables   
Size  0.001 
  (0.529) 
Leverage  -0.032 
  (0.003) 
Bonus  0.007 
  (0.059) 
Risk  -0.001 
  (0.841) 
Growth  -0.005 
  (0.342) 
Net operating assets  -0.014 
  (0.001) 
Litigation  -0.013 
  (0.001) 
Implicit claim  -0.019 
  (0.001) 
 
N  6,387 
Adj. R2  0.022 
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TABLE 6 (continued) 
 
Panel C: Regressions of CEOs’ net sales on abnormal accruals  
 
This panel reports the results from regressing future net sales (%) on equity incentives (%), abnormal accruals, and 
control variables: 
jt,it,i4t,i3t,i2t,i1
t,it,i0jt,i
OCFRetGrowthSize
crualsAbnormalAcIncentEqNetSale
+
−+
+∆++++
++=
ξγγγγ
γ δβ
 , 
where j = 1 or 2, denotes the jth six-month period after the earnings announcement. Positive and negative abnormal 
accruals are included separately to capture their potentially differential effects. Positive abnormal accruals are zero 
when abnormal accruals are negative, and negative abnormal accruals are zero when abnormal accruals are positive. 
To reduce the impact of measurement errors in abnormal accruals, decile ranks (scaled to the range between zero 
and one) are used. See Appendix A for variable measurement. The regressions are estimated on all firm-years with 
data available in the period 1993-2000. Year dummies are included to control for year fixed effects. The p-values in 
parentheses are based on one-sided t-tests for coefficients with signed predictions and on two-sided t-tests otherwise. 
 
  
Predicted 
signs 1st six-month 2nd six-month 
Equity incentives    
Unexercisable options + 0.086 0.064 
  (0.001) (0.002) 
Ownership + 0.016 0.014 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
Exercisable options + -0.008 0.018 
  (0.749) (0.117) 
Abnormal accruals    
Positive abnormal accruals + 0.075 0.074 
  (0.019) (0.054) 
Negative abnormal accruals ? -0.050 -0.073 
  (0.171) (0.093) 
 
Control variables  Yes Yes 
N  2,723 2,316 
Adj. R2  0.109 0.068 
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TABLE 7  
Additional Analyses 
 
Panel A: Results of meeting or just beating analysts’ forecasts based on the ratio of stock and option grants to total 
compensation 
 
This panel reports the results from regressing the probability of earnings surprises in a certain range on equity 
incentives and controls: 
)ControlsIncentEq(logit)Surprise(Prob t,it,ikt,ikk,0kt,i ζγ +++=Φ∈ − γβ , 
where equity incentives include a stock and option grant ratio and ownership, and controls are those included in 
equation (2). The table reports the change in the odds due to a change of one standard deviation of a variable and the 
p-value (in parentheses) of the corresponding coefficient in the logit regressions. The stock and option grant ratio is 
defined as the ratio of stock grants and option grants (both in dollars) to the total compensation, which includes 
salary, bonus, stock grants, option grants, long-term incentive payouts, and other compensation. See Appendix A for 
the measurement of other variables. Year dummies are included to control for year fixed effects. The regressions are 
based on 4,274 firm-years with all required data in the period 1993-2000. 
 
  
Negative earnings surprises 
Φ=(-∞, 0) 
(1)  
Meeting or just beating analysts’ forecasts
Φ=[$0, $0.01] 
(2) 
  
Predicted 
signs 
Change in the odds
(p-value)  
Predicted 
signs  
Change in the odds 
(p-value) 
Equity incentives       
Stock and option grant ratio   - -0.103  + 0.105 
   (0.007)   (0.003) 
Ownership  - -0.203  + 0.297 
   (0.001)   (0.001) 
 
Control variables   Yes   Yes 
Psudo R2   0.195   0.180 
Likelihood ratio   603   612 
(p-value)   (0.001)   (0.001) 
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TABLE 7 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Analyses of future net sales conditional on future realized stock returns 
 
This panel reports results from regressing future net sales (%) on equity incentives (%), a high return dummy 
variable (High_ret), the interactions between equity incentives and the high return dummy, and control variables: 
jt,it,i4t,i3t,i2t,i1
jt,ijt,it,it,i0jt,i
OCFRetGrowthSize
retHighretHighIncentEqIncentEqNetSale
+
+−+−−−+
+∆++++
+×++=
ξγγγγ
χγ δβ
 , 
where j = 1 or 2, denotes the jth six-month period after the earnings announcement. High_reti,t+j is one when the 
return in the period t+j is in the top quartile. See Appendix A for the measurement of other variables. The 
regressions are estimated on all firm-years with data available in the period 1993-2000. Year dummies are included 
to control for year fixed effects. The p-values in parentheses are based on one-sided t-tests. 
 
 
Predicted 
signs 1st six-month 2nd six-month 
Equity incentives    
Unexercisable options + 0.056 0.017 
  (0.003) (0.052) 
Ownership + 0.012 0.008 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
Exercisable options + 0.001 0.006 
  (0.476) (0.374) 
Equity incentives × High_ret    
Unexercisable options × High_ret + 0.080 0.230 
  (0.017) (0.001) 
Ownership × High_ret + 0.016 0.023 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
Exercisable options × High_ret + -0.025 0.046 
  (0.826) (0.072) 
 
High_ret + 0.032 -0.031 
  (0.337) (0.435) 
 
Control variables  Yes Yes 
N  2,723 2,316 
Adj. R2  0.129 0.133 
 
